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ABSTRACT
ESTIMATE OF THE PRICE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION:
THE CASE OF ELECTRICITY
This study estimates the effects of direct electric utility com-
petition on consumer prices. The data are from cities where two
electric firms compete for the same customers. In these situations,
if prices charged by one firm are too high, or services are inferior,
a customer has the opportunity to change to the other firm serving his
city.
Multiple regression analysis shows that substantially lower prices
evolve in competitive situations. The marginal price between 500 and
750 KWH blocks is lower by 16 percent, the marginal price between 750
and 1000 KWH blocks is lower by 19 percent, and the average price
(average revenue) is lower by 33 percent because of competition.
These results provide a measure of the effects of monopoly on the
prices consumers pay and an assessment of the effects of competition
as a regulator of utility rates of municipal utility firms.

ESTIMATE OF THE PRICE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION:
THE CASE OF ELECTRICITY
by Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Economists have long been interested in assessing the effects of
monopoly in the business world. Many sectors of the economy have been
previously examined to determine the impact of market structure dif-
ferences on prices charged for goods and services produced under dif-
ferent competitive conditions. See: Hay and Morris (1979). In spite
of the wide scope of the previous studies, one important segment of
the economy has been neglected and an important question remains
unanswered. The neglected business is municipal electric utility
firms and the question is, what are the pricing effects of monopoly in
that business. Given the rapidly increasing price of electric energy,
better public policy decisions could be made if there was a better
understanding of utility pricing under competitive and monopoly condi-
tions.
Direct competition between two electric utility firms within a
given city has been generally overlooked by public utility researchers.
Although not common, these kind of competitive situations do exist and
they have been discussed in some detail in Primeaux (1975, 1977, 1974)
*University of Illinois, Urbana. George S. Tolley and an anony-
mous referee provided valuable suggestions for improvements. Paul
Newbold, Jon Nelson, Robert Rasche, Patrick Mann, John Mikesell,
Julian Simon, Daniel Hollas, Milton Kafoglis, and John Moorhouse
offered suggestions for modifying an earlier version.
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and in Awh and Primeaux (in press). This competition is briefly dis-
cussed later but for our purposes it is important to explain here that
where direct electric utility competition exists, two electric utility
firms serve a given city and consumers have a choice of being served
by one firm or the other. Consumers choose between the two utility
firms in their city in much the same way as they choose between firms
supplying other goods and services; both quality of service and price
are important considerations. From a given customer's point of view,
however, day to day changes from one company to the other are not
practical, because of the inconvenience of having services disconnected
from one company and then reconnected by the other. Yet, consumers
actually do have the option of changing from one company to the other.
Moreover, competition has tended to eliminate the service charges
imposed for disconnecting service from one company and then connecting
service by the other (Primeaux, 1975); consequently, the economic con-
2
straints to switching companies is significantly weakened. As dis-
cussed later, this direct competition imposes significant pressure on
firms to be efficient while monopoly electric utility firms are free
from such competitive forces.
Although competition may not exist throughout every city, the
previous studies have shown that the competition is vigorous and pro-
vides significant restraining influences upon the rivals, for example
see: Primeaux (1975, 1977).
2
Utility poles are shared in some cities with direct competition
and in other cities two sets of electric poles exist. In all cases,
two sets of electric lines exist. The reader who is interested in
learning more about other aspects of these competitive situations is
directed to Primeaux (1975).
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This is an empirical study of prices charged to residential sub-
scribers by municipal electric firms and the findings are that prices
are significantly lower if firms face competition than if they do not.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Several studies have assessed the impact of competition between
natural gas and electricity by examining differences in economic per-
formance between monopoly electric firms competing with monopoly gas
firms. These results were then compared with combination firms, that
is, those which sell both gas and electricity. These studies are use-
ful and interesting; however, they only focus upon the substitutability
of these two types of energy for some uses as the source of competition
among firms, and they are not concerned with the effects of competition
between firms selling the same service. For examples see: Wilson
(1971) and Brandon (1971).
Primeaux (1975) explained that the effects of direct competition
existing between two electric utility firms in the same city is a
neglected area of research. According to Primeaux (1975), this past
deficiency was caused largely by the general lack of knowledge by
economists that competition does actually exist in the electric
utility business and data are available to test the effects of rivalry
in a "natural monopoly" environment.
Behling (1938) presents an interesting history of competition in
the electric utility business and some insight into natural monopoly
theory. However, his work is void of data or rigorous statistical
analysis.
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Hellman (1972) examined government competition with privately
owned electric firms. He also presents case studies of a number of
cities where direct competition has existed between two electric utility
firms. While Hellman's is an interesting study and does present price
comparisons, it does not use statistical analysis to make comparisons.
Therefore, his conclusions regarding price effects of monopoly vs.
competition should be examined more fully.
Primeaux (1977) assessed X-efficiency gained through competition
and Primeaux (1974) examined price rigidity in this type duopoly, but
neither study examined price effects of competition in this business.
While other previous works have examined competition in a "natural
monopoly" environment, they are all concerned with matters which are
different from the central purpose of this investigation.
THE THEORY
Electric utility firms are generally regulated by rate-of-return
regulation but, for reasons discussed below, it is unnecessary that
rate-of-return regulation be modelled to derive an equation that would
be capable of testing the primary hypothesis of this study. The main
reason for this statement is that firms in the sample are municipally
owned, as mentioned earlier in the text; as such, they are free of
commission regulation and their rates are not set by rate-of-return
procedures.
Firms in the sample are regulated by local regulation which may be
imposed through a locally constituted body such as a public utility
board or a city council. The important point is that these types of
regulators do not use rate-of-return regulation to establish prices
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and they are unconcerned with rate bases. The pricing procedure is
more like that followed by unregulated business firms where a meeting
of some pricing committee is held to discuss a price (rate) change
without the elaborate procedure involved in state commission regula-
tion. Price changes for utility firms in this type of setting are
virtually assured, without state control or scrutiny. Under this type
of regulation, it is not unusual at all for price increases to be
approved in one meeting lasting only a few hours while rate-of-return
regulation of privately owned firms at the state level involves exten-
sive documentation and calculations by both the firm and the regula-
tory commission.
As Primeaux (1977) points out, rate-of-return regulation is based
on cost-plus pricing. In the price setting behavior of interest to
this study, cost considerations are not unimportant; yet, demand con-
siderations are of much more significance than under rate-of-return
regulation.
Rate-of-return regulation commonly requires many months of work
based on financial and economic justification for making the price
change; an essential ingredient in these proceedings is a rate-of-
return and a rate base.
From the above discussion, we may conclude that firms in this
sample are not regulated by either state level or rate-of-return regu-
lation. So the outcome reported in the text of the paper was not
influenced by rate-of-return regulation.
Primeaux (1974) and Awh and Primeaux (in press) have established
that the electric utility firms in the sample are profit seekers and
-6-
3
do, indeed, want profits. Even though firms in the sample are profit
motivated, Primeaux (1977) has shown that there are significant differ-
ences between levels of efficiency of electric utility firms facing
competition and those operating in a monopoly market structure.
Primeaux (1977) explains that the source of inefficiency within monop-
oly electric utility firms originate in the X-inef ficiency concept,
developed by Leibenstein (1966). The X-efficiency concept is multi-
faceted and deals with a number of conditions within a firm which can
affect the level of its efficiency. Among those conditions is the
degree of competition a firm faces; that is the condition of primary
interest to this study. Leibenstein would attribute the X-inef f iciency
of monopoly firms to the fact that competitive rivalry cannot force
them to become efficient; consequently, there is a different level of
effort caused by market structure differences.
Primeaux (1975 and 1977) found electric utility inefficiency to be
manifested in higher operating cost levels for the monopoly firms.
Although many of the same operating conditions exist whether an
electric utility firm operates as a monopoly or whether it competes
for the same customers within a given city, two conditions tend to
cause lower consumer prices to emerge in competitive situations.
First, since the nonmonopoly firms are forced to be more X-eff icient
because of the competitive rivalry, lower operating costs would result,
as shown in Primeaux (1975). These lower costs would tend to permit
3
Firms in this study are a subset of samples used in some previous
studies. The earlier studies examined questions of efficiency, cost
levels and price flexibility but they were not concerned with price
levels, which is the central concern of this study.
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the firm to set lower prices, even if it maintained accounting profit
near the monopoly levels. The second condition which would tend to
cause lower consumer prices to emerge with rivalry is the competitive
pressure which is exerted on price levels. Since consumers served by
competitive firms have the opportunity of being served by one electric
firm or the other, firm prices cannot be set at levels which exist in
monopoly situations. If a firm sets prices which are too high, con-
sumers will switch their service to the firm with lower prices, as
they do when they purchase other goods and services. Firms in these
kind of competitive situations must consider demand conditions as they
4
set prices.
Residential prices of electricity are affected by a number of
variables which can be broadly categorized as demand and cost factors.
The income of the buyer is an important demand determinate of con-
sumption and thus affects price levels. With higher customer incomes,
the utility firm is able to exact higher customer prices for its
services.
The price of natural gas should also affect prices charged for
electric services. For many uses, natural gas can be substituted for
electricity; this substitutability should put downward pressure on
electricity prices.
The price of electricity should be affected by consumer density in
the service area. Since the number of customers per square mile
4
Primeaux (1974 and 1975) has shown that there is no evidence of
price fixing behavior between firms in this type of competitive
situation.
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affects distribution costs, a higher density should be reflected in a
lower consumer price and vice versa.
Production costs of the electric utility also affect electricity
prices. Costs of fuel and other production expenses (including
purchased power) would be included in the costing formula used by
those responsible for making the pricing decisions and rate schedules.
Higher costs per kilowatt would obviously result in higher residential
prices.
In addition to the production expenses, mentioned above, other
operating expenses would also affect price levels because higher
expense levels would cause firms to charge higher prices. These costs
would also be included in the pricing formula used to construct rate
schedules.
The composition of customer types should also affect rate schedu-
les. There is a different cost mix in serving residential consumers
compared with commercial and industrial consumers. This is an
important consideration because those establishing rate schedules must
consider the common costs associated with producing electricity for
residential, commercial, and industrial uses. One would expect the
residential price to be lower as the proportion of residential con-
sumers increases. These results are supported by previous research by
the author.
Primeaux (1975) found in a study of average costs of firms of the
same type in a very similar sample that the variable for consumption
per residential consumer possessed a larger negative coefficient than
the coefficient for commercial and industrial consumption per customer.
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Climatic factors also affect the demand and price of electricity
because seasonal variations cause differences in cooling and heating
requirements of customers served by electric firms. These variations
affect capacity costs for the supplying firms and affect the price
schedules.
Competition should also affect electric rates. If the rivalry is
vigorous and if costs are not higher with competition, lower consumer
prices should result.
Linear ordinary least squares regression analysis was used to
develop the price equations used in this analysis.
METHODOLOGY
As mentioned earlier, there is very little discussion of electric
utility duopolies in the literature even though there actually are
cities with competing electric utility firms.
Data from the existing duopoly markets provided the information
for assessing the impact of competition upon price levels charged by
electric utility firms. In the duopolistically competitive cities,
there was actual duplication of distribution facilities and in some
g
cases generation capacity. The usual arrangement was that a privately
The justification for this approach is discussed in some detail
in footnote 13.
F. Steward Brown, then Chief, Bureau of Power of the Federal
Power Commission, revealed in correspondence to the author dated July
29, 1969, that direct competition between two electric utility firms
existed in forty-nine cities. The data are as of January 1, 1966, for
cities with a population of 2,500 or larger.
Although this condition may seem to indicate inefficiency,
Primeaux (1975) reported beneficial effects from competition because
average costs were actually lowered when it existed.
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owned electric firm competed with a municipally owned firm. Supply
conditions were such that the consumer had a choice of being served by
one firm or the other. In the Texas and Missouri cities, for example,
a customer could switch from one firm to the other at will. In
Portland, Oregon, on the other hand, new customers could take service
from either company. However, once they had selected a firm they
could not switch from one electric supplier to the other. Cities
where terrorists are allocated and duplication of facilities does not
exist were not included in the study. Primeaux (1974b) presents a
detailed case study of a city served by two competing electric utility
firms.
It was not possible to obtain data for the individual cities
served by privately owned firms. This difficulty was caused because
privately owned electric utilities do not allocate or report sales and
revenue data according to the individual cities in which they operate;
therefore, the data necessary for an adequate examination of privately
owned firms are not available. Since privately owned firms usually
serve several cities and face competition in some communities and not
in others, published data for privately owned firms are not useful for
this study.
9
Price data for block, rates of privately owned firms are presented
in Typical Electric Bills (Washington: Federal Power Commission).
However, operating data published by the Federal Power Commission,
\
which could be useful for an examination of privately owned firms, are
not allocated to the individual cities in which the firms operate.
Thus, they are not useful in this study.
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For the above reasons, and because privately owned firms are
generally regulated by state regulatory commission, it was decided
to focus attention on cross section data for two subsets of municipally
owned firms, each firm operating in a different city. As mentioned
earlier, firms in the duopoly subset established prices in the face of
rivalry, the other group set prices in a monopoly environment and com-
petition did not affect price levels. Data from these two subsets of
firms would indicate relative price levels of firms in monopoly and
duopolistically competitive markets.
Generally, a "matched" firm without competition was selected for
every firm with competition. The criteria used to select the matched
firms were as follows: First, to the extent possible, the matched
firm should be from the same state as the firm with which it would be
paired. Second, the matched firm should be approximately the same
size (in terms of KWH sales) as the firm with which it would be
paired; if no such firm existed in the relevant state, a larger firm
was accepted; competitive firms were never matched with smaller firms.
Third, to the extent possible, types of power sources should be iden-
tical for both matched firm and the competitive firm.
This analysis does not attempt to answer any questions con-
cerning the effectiveness of utility regulation. As mentioned
earlier, since municipally owned utility prices are controlled by some
local commission, regulatory effects on the results are minimized by
following this procedure. It is true that prices set for privately
owned utilities by a state regulatory commission effectively puts a
ceiling on prices which may be charged by a supplier that faces com-
petition. Our interests, however, center on the question of whether
rate levels are lowered by competition.
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The matching procedure was used to select a noncompetitive subset
to be compared with the duopolistically competitive subset. The
matching was undertaken because, first, it was thought that it would
reduce heteroscedasticity and the variance in the error term in regres-
sions. Second, if the matched firm was selected from the same state
as the firm with competition, some interstate price differences not
picked up by the estimating equations might be eliminated. Third, if
the matched firms were at least as large as the competitive firms, any
price differences due to scale effects not picked up by the estimating
equations would tend to bias the results of the analysis in favor of
those cities without competition. Hence the results of the study are
more conservative. Fourth, if the types of power sources for the
competing and noncompeting firms were matched, price differences due
to supply characteristics which may not have been picked up by the
estimating equations would tend to be eliminated.
It was not possible to adhere to the guidelines for matching firms
in all cases. Municipally owned firms from the cities listed in
column one of Table I filed F.P.C. reports and operating data are
published in Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the
United States . These firms constitute the subset of competing elec-
tric enterprises. Other competing publicly owned firms were eliminated
In some cases the bases of the matching were more important in
Primeaux (1975) than in this paper. The sample in this investigation
is not identical to that in that study; however, a subset of firms
from the same basic sample was used in this study. It was also
necessary to eliminate some firms contained in that study, because
data were not available for the variables used in this analysis. The
unmatched data in Table I resulted from the elimination of some firms
for reasons mentioned above but retaining the matched city.
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because data were not available. Data from 1967 were used because
Mann and Mikesell (1971) indicated that this was a stable year for
making comparisons; moreover, it was feared that more recent data may
have been affected by inflation.
Column two of Table I presents the cities from which the matched
municipally owned monopoly firms were selected. As indicated, it was
not always possible to select matched firms from the same state for
all competing electric companies. Table I also presents the relative
size of the firms in terms of kilowatt-hour sales. The crucial
matching test with respect to size involved the sales volume (annual
KWH) of the competitive and noncompetitive firms.
THE REGRESSION MODELS
As mentioned earlier, linear ordinary least squares regression
analysis was used to examine the effects of competition and monopoly
INSERT TABLE
ABOUT HERE
12
Lincoln, Nebraska, and Hagerstown, Maryland are included in the
sample even though competition did not exist in those cities in 1967.
This was justified because it was believed that any competitive effects
would have continued to that year. Hagerstown prevented customers
from switching to the competitive firm as of September, 1967. Com-
petition terminated in Lincoln, Nebraska in 1965. The inclusion of
all competitive firms would have required the use of unpublished data
which the F.P.C. considered too incomplete to justify publication.
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on residential prices of firms included in the sample. Price func-
tions were specified for residential prices and these equations made
possible the assessment of the effect of market structure differences
on prices of electricity.
As mentioned earlier, the price schedules for firms selling to
residential customers are determined by demand variables, as well as
cost conditions, faced by the selling firms. This is a recursive
14
model and the specification of the residential price function is:
13
Linear specifications were used because the statistical rela-
tionships in all of the previous studies were found to be linear.
That is, whenever the specified models were run in nonlinear form, the
fit to the data was adversely affected. For example see: Primeaux
(1975).
Moreover, the equations discussed later in Table II were slightly
modified to nonlinear form and, in the alternative specification, the
squared output term was statistically insignificant. These regression
results are available from the author upon request.
A simultaneous equation model was not used for two reasons.
First, as footnote 14 indicates, the model is recursive and involves a
"causal chain" case; consequently, this is not a simultaneous equation
issue at all. Moreover, even if a simultaneous equation model were
appropriate, the sample size makes the selection of this approach over
OLS unnecessary. Zellner (1979, p. 634) explains that for small
samples, simultaneous equation results are very close to or exactly
equal to OLS estimates.
14
This is not a simultaneous equation issue but is, instead, an
example of what Professor Herman Wold referred to as the "causal
chain" case and a recursive model. In this case, EXKWH and PRcost
(discussed below) can be taken as having occurred in an exogenous
fashion. The direction of effect is one way only. While EXKWH and
PRcost are cost variables which affect prices through the pricing for-
mula, prices do not affect costs. In a recursive model, ordinary
least squares produces consistent and unbiased estimates. The
necessary assumption of independence among the error terms is most
reasonable because the recursiveness is a natural product of the model
due to the economic character of the system modeled. For discussions
see: Elliott (1973 and Kmenta (1971).
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P = A + B INCOME + B„%RES + B^EXKWH + B,PRCOST + B r CLIMI
1 2 3 4 5
(1)
+ B,CLIMII + B.CLIMIII + B o DC0M + B nGAS + BnnDENSITY6 7 o y 1U
Where all variables are in linear form and P, the dependent variable,
is a price variable which consists of several different definitions,
depending upon the equation specified.
Price Variables (Dependent Variables)
MP = Marginal price between the 250 KWH typical electric bills
rate and the 500 KWH typical electric bills rate.
MP = Marginal price between the 500 KWH typical electric bills
rate and the 750 KWH typical electric bills rate.
MP = Marginal price between the 750 KWH typical electric bills
rate and the 1000 KWH typical electric bills rate.
Y = Average residential price; sales revenue/KWH sold.
Cost and Demand Variables (Independent Variables)
INCOME = Mean county estimated buying income per household.
GAS = Average gas price-state.
DENSITY = Number of customers per square mile.
%RES = Ratio of total residential sales to total commercial and
industrial sales.
EXKWH = Operating and maintenance expense per KWH.
PRCOST = Cost per KWH generated and purchased.
CLIMI = A regional climatic dummy variable for the corn belt
15
area.
A more detailed description of the climatic variables is pre-
sented in the Appendix.
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CLIMII = A regional climatic dummy variable for the Dakota-New
England area.
CLIMIII = A regional climatic dummy variable for the humid
Northwest area.
DCOM = The dummy variable, 1 if duopoly, if monopoly.
Data sources and a more extensive discussion of all variables are
presented in the Appendix. As developed in the theory section, the
coefficient on the %RES variable and the DENSITY variable should be
negative and the coefficient on all other variables except DCOM should
be positive. The appropriate sign for the climatic dummy variables is
not obvious. The omitted dummy variable is for the cotton belt, so
the signs on these dummy variables would reflect relative price levels
with those in the cotton belt climatic region.
The appropriate sign on the competition dummy variable is also not
obvious. If competition causes lower electricity prices the sign
should be negative; however, if competition results in higher elec-
tricity prices, the sign should be positive.
RESULTS
The residential equations were estimated by using cross section
data as outlined in the earlier section on methodology.
Table II shows the best specification of the equations using
either the average price or marginal prices as the dependent
-17-
variables. T statistics appear in parentheses below the coef-
ficients in Table II; the signs for all variables included in the four
equations in Table II conform to expectations.
Interestingly, the signs of the coefficients of the competition
dummy variable for the equations in Table II are all negative indi-
cating that competition caused the price of residential electricity to
be lower with competition, regardless of whether a marginal or average
price variable is used as the dependent variable.
Since the Federal Power Commission used standard rate blocks for
all firms in Typical Electric Bills
,
rate blocks for all firms are
comparable. The difference between the price paid by a customer if he
consumed in one block and the price he would pay in the next highest
block represents a marginal price. The coefficient on the competition
dummy variable for the MP price is negative but not statistically
significant at the 12 percent level. However, the coefficients on the
other price variables are all negative and MP significant at the 5
percent level, Y significant at the 10 percent level, and MP signif-
—2
icant at the 12 percent level. The low R and the insignificant t
statistics on the competition dummy variable in the MP and MP
The GAS variable and DENSITY variable were not statistically
significant and did not increase the explained variance when they were
included in the equation.
The gas price data were state average prices. Since the sample
included a larger number of relatively small cities, it was impossible
to obtain gas price data for those individual cities. Perhaps this
explains why the gas variable was unimportant and frequently had the
wrong sign on the coefficient.
INSERT TABLE
ABOUT HERE
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equations in Table II probably reveal that for smaller blocks of con-
sumption demand and cost variables are less important than social con-
siderations in establishing electricity prices.
The four equations in Table II reflect that the impact of com-
petition on residential electricity prices is quite significant. As
mentioned earlier, the marginal price of moving from the 250 KWH block
to the 500 KWH block (MP ) is statistically insignificant. However,
the marginal price of moving from the 500 KWH block to the 7 50 KWH
block (MP ) is lowered by $1.34 because of competition and the mar-
ginal price of moving from the 750 KWH block to the 1000 KWH block
(MP ) is lowered by $2.25. The average price (average revenue) is
18
lowered by $6.3133 per 1000 KWH because of competition. At mean
The following interpretation of the greater effect of rivalry
for large than for small usage-price discrimination is reasonable:
Households with low usage—thus low expenditures—will tend not to
switch from one seller to another when offered a lower price because
of the fixed costs of switching; since connect and disconnect charges
are frequently not imposed, these costs would also involve the dis-
utility of having to make a change when relative small cost savings
are realized. But for large users the costs of switching are dominated
by the gains to switching. An electric utility firm faced with a
rival should respond to these differential elasticities by making
larger downward price adjustments to large users than to small users,
relative to the price schedule of a firm without competition.
1 ft
To ensure that the results were not caused by the inclusion of
very large firms not facing competition, the equations were reestimated
excluding the four monopoly cities considerably above mean size. No
important differences appeared. The signs on all variables were
consistent with those in equations including the whole sample. The
effects of the elimination of these observations on the competition
dummy variable were very slight. The MP2 price was lowered by $1.59
instead of $1.34; the MP3 price was lowered by $2.36 instead of $2.25;
and the Y]_ price was lowered by $7.17 instead of $6.31. Consequently,
inclusion of the four largest cities did not bias the results in favor
of competition; indeed, the effect was the other way around.
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prices for the sample, these decreases amount to 16 percent and 19
percent respectively for the marginal price. The average price (Y )
was lowered by 33 percent.
Interaction variables were used to determine whether the effect of
competition had influenced the slope coefficients of the economic vari-
ables. These variables were constructed by multiplying the competi-
tion dummy variable by the economic variables in the equation.
Only the interaction variable (%RES*D) constructed by multiplying
the competition dummy variable by the %RES variable was statistically
significant, indicating that only the slope coefficient of that
variable was affected by competition. Table III presents the sta-
tistics necessary to test the hypothesis that all coefficients of the
interaction variables were zero, except the variable for %RES. The
results show that the hypothesis cannot be rejected (that is, the
calculated F value of .18797 is less than the F-table value for 27
degrees of freedom in the denominator and 3 degrees of freedom in the
numerator). Thus it was necessary to modify the basic equation only
by adding the %RES*D interaction variable to reflect the effects on
price of competition. As mentioned earlier, the competition dummy
variable was not affected by competition for the MP equation; all
interaction variables in the equation for this price variable were
similarly unaffected by competition.
INSERT TABLE
III ABOUT HER
The change in slope coefficients for all but equation (1) in Table
II indicates that price is affected by market structure differences
because of some characteristic which is different in the competitive
-20-
subset of firms compared with monopoly subset. This change is pro-
bably caused by the increased distribution costs of residential con-
sumer sales with competition. This effect is due to the lower cus-
tomer density with competition which causes upward pressure on costs
and prices as utility firms must provide distribution facilities
through a given area to serve fewer customers than if monopoly existed.
The change in the slope coefficient of the %RES variable reveals
that for the duopoly firms, price tends to be higher as the ratio of
total residential sales to total commercial and industrial sales
increases. Computations show that the duopoly MP~ price is lower than
the monopoly price as long as the ratio is <^ .43. The duopoly MP,
price will also be lower than the monopoly price as long as the ratio
of total residential sales to total commercial and industrial sales is
_< .42. The average price, Y, , will be lower under duopoly than under
monopoly as long as the ratio is <^ .45.
CONCLUSIONS
Prices of electricity are lower with competition than in a monopoly
market structure and the price differences are substantial. The mar-
ginal price between the 500 and 7 50 KWH blocks is lower by 16 percent,
the marginal price between the 750 and 1000 KWH blocks is lower by 19
percent, and the average price (average revenue) is lower by 33 per-
cent because of competition. These results provide a measure of the
19
19
As mentioned in footnote 16, the DENSITY variable, reflecting
the number of customers served per square mile, was used in the
equation to pick up the effects on price of density differences.
However, this variable did not add to the explained variance.
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effect of monopoly on the prices consumers pay and an assessment of
the effect of competition as a regulator of utility rates of municipal
utility firms.
Substantial benefit seems to accrue to customers whenever electric
utility competition exists. In addition to the lower prices, con-
sumers have a choice whenever competition exists. The existence of an
alternative supply, in contrast to the usual monopoly conditions,
obviously provides consumers with a more favorable buying situation
(Primeaux (1974)). Consumer satisfaction with electric utility com-
petition is reflected in the fact that they have been reluctant to
vote it out in cities where it exists (Primeaux (1974b)). Previous
studies have indicated that the present regulatory environment is
hostile to electric utility competition (Primeaux (1979) and Primeaux
et. al. (1984); however, consumer welfare may be enhanced if policy
makers would carefully reevaluate policies which tend to discourage
this type of rivalry.
-22-
APPENDIX
Sources of Data
Price Variables
Data for marginal prices were obtained from Typical Electric Bills ,
Marginal prices were computed by taking the difference between one
rate block and the next largest rate block. The marginal price,
therefore, is the price of moving into the next rate category.
The average price or average revenue data were taken from
Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities . The average price
data were computed by dividing total residential dollar sales by the
number of KWH sold to residential consumers.
Cost and Demand Variables
Data for the INCOME variable are the estimated mean buying income
per household—county average. These data are from 1968 Survey of
Buying Power .
The GAS price variable data were taken from Gas Facts . The
variable was constructed by dividing state total gas sales by MCF
sales to obtain an average price per MCF. Data for individual cities
included in the sample were unavailable.
The DENSITY variable was constructed by dividing the number of
square miles in each city into the number of residential customers
served by each firm. Land area in square miles was taken from the
U.S. Department of Commerce, Area Measurement Reports . Numbers of
customers were taken from Statistics of Publicly Owned Utilities in
the U.S.
-23-
The %RES variable is the ratio of total KWH sales made to residen-
tial consumers. Data are from Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric
Utilities in the U.S.
The EXKWH variable is operating and maintenance expense per KWH.
Data are from Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the
U.S.
The PRCOST variable represents production expense per KWH. This
cost includes purchased power costs, in addition to production
expense. Data are from Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities
in the U.S.
The climatic dummy variables group firms in the sample from simi-
lar climatic areas. The Dakota-New England Area: Winters - very cold
and snowy, summer mild and rainy. The Corn Belt Area: Winters - mod-
erately cold and snowly, summers hot and rainy. The Cotton Belt:
Winters - cool and rainy, summers hot and rainy. The Humid Northwest:
Winters - cool and rainy, summers mild and rainy. These classifica-
tions are taken from World Book Encyclopedia . A map delineates the
various climatic areas of the U.S.; for this study, only the above
areas are relevant.
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TABLE I
CITIES FROM WHICH MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRIC
UTILITIES WERE SELECTED FOR THE STUDY
(SIZE IN TERMS OF THOUSANDS OF KWH SOLD-1967)*
CITIES WITH COMPETITION KWH SALES
MATCHED CITIES -
WITHOUT COMPETITION KWH SALES
Bessemer, Alabama 96,897
Tarrant City, Alabama 57,014
Fort Wayne, Indiana 301,026
Maquoketa, Iowa 16,531
Hagerstown, Maryland 102,330
Allegan, Michigan 15,775
Bay City, Michigan 92,518
Dowagiac, Michigan . 20,964
Ferrysburg, Michigan 130,620
Traverse City, Michigan 64,094
Kennett, Missouri 34,281
Poplar Bluff, Missouri 58,362
Trenton, Missouri 24,699
Lincoln, Nebraska 124,026°
Cleveland, Ohio 521,191
Columbus, Ohio 166,771
Piqua, Ohio 121,818
Springfield, Oregon 166,103
Greer, South Carolina 42,931
Garland, Texas 303,914
Florence, Alabama 408,069
Scottsboro, Alabama 81,784
Richmond, Indiana 357,959
Algona, Iowa 25,940
Bristol, Virginia 196,344
Niles, Michigan 59,974
Wyandotte, Michigan 108,391
Hillsdale, Michigan 63,027
Lansing, Michigan 1,179,935
Sturgis, Michigan 66,935
Petoskey, Michigan 28,463
Rolla, Missouri 45,201
Omaha, Nebraska 2,343,826 c
Springfield, Illinois 501,079
Logansport, Indiana 119,687
Eugene, Oregon 1,123,796
Greenwood, South Carolina 67,829
Watertown, South Dakota 53,944
San Antonio, Texas 2,913,818
Springfield, Missouri 583,488
Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the United States
Data for municipally owned firms in each city were for the year 1967,
unless other years are indicated.
This city is served by Grand Haven Board of Light and Power and
Consumers Power Company.
Competition terminated in 1965, therefore, 1965 sales were used for
matching cities.
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TABLE III
F-TEST STATISTICS OF CROSS SECTION DATA
WITH INTERACTION VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION
Mean Sum of
Standard Degrees of Square Squared
Regression Error Freedom Error Residuals
Equation 2 in Table II,
including all inter-
action variables .73700 27 .54317 14.6657
Equation 2 in Table II,
including only %RES*D
interaction .70644 30 .49906 14.9720
Difference 3 .3063
.3063
F
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